Judicial Abuse of  Process : Examining the Applicability of Section 2F1.1(b)(4)(B) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Bankruptcy Fraud by Sano, Hideaki
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 98 Issue 4 
2000 
Judicial Abuse of "Process": Examining the Applicability of 
Section 2F1.1(b)(4)(B) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
Bankruptcy Fraud 
Hideaki Sano 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hideaki Sano, Judicial Abuse of "Process": Examining the Applicability of Section 2F1.1(b)(4)(B) of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Bankruptcy Fraud, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1038 (2000). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol98/iss4/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Judicial Abuse of "Process": Examining the 
Applicability of Section 2F1.1(b )( 4)(B) of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Bankruptcy Fraud 
Hideaki Sano 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
IN'IRODUCTION ...........................................................•.....•.................... 1038 
I. THE ABUSE OF PROCESS ARGUMENT FOR APPL YING 
SECTION 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) TOBANKRUPTCYFRAUD ............... 1043 
A. The Text ofSection2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) ................................... 1044 
B. The Commentary to Section2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) .................... 1046 
II. THE ANALOGY ARGUMENT FOR APPLYING SECTION 
2Fl.1(b)(4)(B) TOBANKRUPTCYFRAUD ....•......................•... 1050 
A. The Text of and Commentary to Section 
2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) ..................................................................... 1051 
B. Aggravated Criminal Intent in the Context of 
Section2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) ....................................................... 1052 
C. The Analogy Argument Permits Double Counting ......... 1058 
ill. THEPOLICYOFTIIE GUIDELINES .........................•.................. 1061 
N. PERJURY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FRAUD ....................••...... 1066 
CONCLUSION ......................................•.............................••....••.............• 1070 
IN'IRODUCTION 
The proliferation of bankruptcy filings over the past decade has 
coincided with a comparable increase in the incidence of bankruptcy 
fraud.1 In response to this growing problem, the United States 
1. Bankruptcy fraud consists of a knowingly false statement about a material fact made 
under penalty of perjury and in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. See United States v. 
Dantuma, No. rrl-3077, 1998 WL 567939, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 1998) (listing the elements 
of bankruptcy fraud); see also Clymer v. United States, No. 95-55941, 1996 WL 393510, at *1 
(9th Cir. July 9, 1996) (same). In Senate hearings on bankruptcy fraud conducted in 1994, 
Senator Metzenbaum stressed his concern over the proliferation of bankruptcy fraud: 
Annual case filings have climbed from 300,000 in 1980 to 944,000 in 1991 and in excess of $26 
billion is at stake in these filings. Commensurate with the rise in filings has been an increase 
in the number of fraudulent schemes that undermine the goals of Federal bankruptcy. For 
example, individuals have feigned bankruptcy to avoid debt collection and foreclosure by 
their creditors. Numerous bank officials and their customers have used the bankruptcy pro­
cess to shield themselves from discovery or prosecution from fraud. Drug defendants are 
using bankruptcy filings to frustrate and delay drug asset forfeiture proceedings. Hundreds 
of typing mills are luring customers with vague promises of solving their credit problems, 
charging the customer hundreds of dollars while inducing them to sign bankruptcy petitions 
they often do not understand, and then improperly filing bankruptcy on their behalf. 
1038 
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Department of Justice has placed greater emphasis on federal prose­
cution of bankruptcy fraud.2 As a result, federal judges are increas­
ingly applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines")3 to 
bankruptcy fraud and have begun to implement uniform standards for 
sentencing defendants convicted of this crime.4 
Congress enacted the Guidelines pursuant to the Sentencing Re­
form Act of 1984.5 In instituting the Guidelines, Congress sought hon­
esty, reasonable uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing.6 Con-
140 CONG. REC. 28,753 (1994) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). 
2 See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Protecting the Bankruptcy Process: The Propriety of En­
hancing a Bankruptcy Criminal's Sentence for Abuse of Judicial Orders or Process, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1997, at 12, 12. The Attorney General and other high-ranking offi­
cials in the Department of Justice have identified bankruptcy fraud as a "high priority" item 
through memoranda and training programs focusing on bankruptcy fraud. See Judith 
Benderson, Bankruptcy Crime: Balancing the Scales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 1994, at 21, 
21, 31. Some of these training programs have included several hundred Assistant U.S. At­
torneys, Assistant U.S. Trustees, Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents, and other 
federal investigators. See id. at 21. The training programs have increased the prosecution of 
bankruptcy fraud by facilitating the formation of bankruptcy fraud task forces and by raising 
the level of concern among government attorneys about bankruptcy fraud. See id. Other 
components of the Department of Justice, such as individual U.S. Attorneys' Offices and the 
FBI, have held their own bankruptcy fraud training. See id. at 31. Even newsletters sent to 
government attorneys nationwide have emphasized the importance of bankruptcy fraud by 
including numerous articles on the subject. See id. at 21, 31. 
3. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998-99) [hereinafter USSG]. 
4. See Gaumer, supra note 2, at 12. Under the Guidelines, the court determines a de­
fendant's sentence based on a number of factors including the conduct underlying the 
charged offense (the "base offense") and any relevant adjustments ("any appropriate spe­
cific offense characteristics"). See USSG, supra note 3, § lBl.1. A sentencing court must 
first select the Guidelines' base offense provision most applicable to the nature of the crime 
of conviction in order to determine a numerical value used to calculate the length of a de­
fendant's sentence (the "base offense level"). See id. § lBl.2 application note 1. In order to 
guide this determination, the Guidelines include a Statutory Index which provides a list of 
criminal offenses and the appropriate base offense provision or provisions. See id. Each of 
these provisions lists a base offense level for the particular offense. See id. ch. 2. These base 
offense levels may be subject to an upward ("enhancement") or downward ("reduction") 
adjustment depending on the applicability of specific offense characteristic provisions that 
describe aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See id. chs. 2-3. After the base offense 
level is established, the court determines the range of the defendant's sentence by comparing 
the base offense level to the Sentencing Table. See id. § lBl.l(a)-(g), ch. 5, pt. A. Sentence 
reductions or enhancements may be appropriate based on specific offender characteristics or 
specified grounds for departure from the prescribed range. See id. § lBl.l(i), ch. 5, pts. H & 
K. 
5. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 991-98, and scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1994)). Also known as Title II of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the Sentencing Reform Act requires the development of 
guidelines to further the goals of criminal punishment, namely, "deterrence, incapacitation, 
just punishment, and rehabilitation." USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(2). Under the Act, 
Congress has "delegate[d] broad authority to the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission to review 
and rationalize the federal sentencing process." Id. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 901 
(1991) (discussing the purpose of the Guidelines). 
6. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). Congress considered pre-Guidelines sen­
tencing confusing and deceptive in that it required courts to impose indeterminate sentences 
that could be changed by parole commissions. See id. Pre-Guidelines sentencing also often 
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gress attempted to achieve honest sentencing by eliminating parole.7 
In order to realize uniformity and proportionality, Congress created 
the United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Commis­
sion") to devise a sentencing scheme that balances the tension be­
tween uniform and proportional sentencing.8 
The Sentencing Commission has mandated that courts apply the 
Guidelines' provisions in a consistent manner in order to maintain this 
balance.9 Most courts agree that bankruptcy fraud should be sen­
tenced under section 2F1.1, the Guidelines' base offense provision for 
fraud.10 Courts disagree, however, about the propriety of applying sec­
tion 2F1.1(b)(4)(B), one of several enhancement provisions under sec­
tion 2F1.1, to bankruptcy fraud.11 Section 2F1.1(b)(4)(B) (the "proc­
ess enhancement") allows a sentencing court to increase a defendanf s 
sentence if the defendant violates "any judicial or administrative or­
der, injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the 
guidelines."12 The Sentencing Commission, however, failed to define 
the word "process" in the text of, or commentary to the Guidelines.13 
According to Black's Law Dictionary, there are two potential defi­
nitions of "process."14 Defined narrowly, "process" means a legal in­
strument issued by the court and directed at the defendant to inform 
him of the institution of proceedings against him and to compel his 
resulted in a "wide disparity in sentences inlposed for similar criminal offenses committed by 
similar offenders," weakening sentencing uniformity and proportionality. Id. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(2)-(3), at 1-2 This tension exists because, although the complexity 
and judicial discretion necessary in a proportional sentencing system undermines sentencing 
uniformity, the sinlplicity necessary for a uniform sentencing system inlpedes proportional 
sentencing. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(3), at 2-3. 
9. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(2); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 42 (1993) (stating that 
the Guidelines bind judges); United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that courts should apply the Guidelines as written). 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Cheek, 69 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying section 
2Fl.1 to bankruptcy fraud); United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(same); United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518, 520 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that "[c]rimes of 
fraud and deceit" such as bankruptcy fraud should be sentenced under section 2Fl.1). 
11. Compare United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding 
application of the enhancement to bankruptcy fraud), United States v. Welch, 103 F.3d 906, 
908 (9th Cir. 1996) (same), Michalek, 54 F.3d at 332 (same), and Bellew, 35 F.3d at 521 
(same), with United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 531 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
enhancement does not apply to bankruptcy fraud), and United States v. Carrozzella, 105 
F.3d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1997) (same). Note that the cases predating the 1998 amendments to 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines refer to section 2Fl.l(b)(3)(B). Under the amendments, 
this provision was stricken and reenacted as 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B). 
12. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.l(b )(4)(B) (emphasis added). 
13. See, e.g., Ca"ozzella, 105 F.3d at 800 (discussing the possible definitions of "proc­
ess"); Welch, 103 F.3d at 908 (same). 
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (7th ed. 1999). 
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appearance.ts Defined broadly, "process" constitutes the "proceed­
ings in any action or prosecution."t6 
The different definitions of "process" affect the scope of the proc­
ess enhancement. With the narrower definition of "process," the en­
hancement applies only to situations in which a defendant convicted of 
fraud has violated a formal legal instrument, such as a summons or an 
order issued by a court and directed specifically at the defendant.17 
With the expansive definition, however, the process enhancement 
would apply to the more extensive range of misconduct known as 
abuse of process.ts Such conduct "includes any serious misuse of judi­
cial or administrative proceedings intended to inflict unnecessary costs 
or delay on an adversary or to confer undeserved advantages on the 
actor."t9 
The Sentencing Commission's failure to define "process" has re­
sulted in a controversy among several federal circuit courts over the 
meaning of the process enhancement and its applicability to bank­
ruptcy fraud.20 The majority of circuits have held that the word "proc­
ess" should be read broadly and that the phrase "violation of judicial 
process" in the process enhancement should be interpreted as abuse of 
process (the "abuse of process argument").2t Thus, several courts 
have held that because bankruptcy fraud inherently involves abuse of 
process, it constitutes a violation of the process enhancement even 
when the defendant has not violated a specific judicial order, injunc­
tion, or decree.22 
15. See id. (defining process as "[a] summons or writ, esp. to appear or respond in 
court"). 
16. Id. 
17. See Carrozzella, 105 F .3d at 800. 
18. See BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY, supra note 14, at 10 (defining "abuse of process" as 
the "improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is 
either unlawful or beyond the process's scope"). 
19. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 800. Filing baseless complaints of motions in court and 
submitting fraudulent filings to an administrative agency, for example, constitute abuses of 
process. See id. 
20. See supra note 11. 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Kubick, 199 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
process enhancement for abuse of process); United States v. Guthrie, 144 F.3d 1006, 1010 
(6th Cir.1998) (holding that "the term 'judicial process' as used in§ 2Fl.l(b)(3)(B) includes 
bankruptcy proceedings"); United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997) 
("The district court's interpretation of judicial 'process' to embrace judicial proceedings .. .  
i s  more reasonable."); United States v .  Welch, 103 F.3d 906, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that including a defendant's 
abuse of the bankruptcy proceeding within the process enhancement "is consistent with the 
realities of bankruptcy practice"). 
22 See, e.g., Guthrie, 144 F.3d at 1010; Michalek, 54 F.3d at 332; United States v. Lloyd, 
947 F2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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Other circuits have upheld enhancement of a bankruptcy fraud 
sentence under the process enhancement based on a different ration­
ale: they rely on the defendant's violation of several bankruptcy rules 
and forms that mandate truthful and complete disclosure of assets and 
liabilities by debtors.23 Although such rules and forms are not techni­
cally instruments issued by a court, several courts have analogized 
them to court or administrative orders or directives within the mean­
ing of the process enhancement (the "analogy argument").24 Under 
this interpretation, the process enhancement would apply to bank­
ruptcy fraud even if the Sentencing Commission intended "process" to 
be read narrowly.25 
A third group of circuits, however, has held that bankruptcy fraud 
does not necessarily merit an adjustment pursuant to the process en­
hancement. 26 The First Circuit has rejected the analogy argument and 
held that the process enhancement pertains only to defendants who 
violate a formal legal instrument issued by the court, such as a sum­
mons or court order.27 Moreover, by analyzing "process" only in its 
narrow sense, the First Circuit logically foreclosed the abuse of proc­
ess argument.28 The Second Circuit has explicitly rejected the abuse of 
process argument in dicta by indicating that in the context of the proc­
ess enhancement, "process" should be read narrowly.29 These courts 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 1997) ("(E]ven when 
the fraudulent debtor takes the very first act by filing his petition in bankruptcy, he is acting 
subsequently to the previously adopted and promulgated standing orders and standard 
forms."); Michalek, 54 F3d at 333 (stating that bankruptcy fraud defendants act "in direct 
violation of the requirements of the rules and forms of the Bankruptcy Rules"); United 
States v. Bellew, 35 F3d 518, 519-21 (11th Cir. 1994). 
24. See Saacks, 131 F.3d at 546; Michalek, 54 F3d at 333 (stating that the defendant falls 
under the process enhancement for fraudulently filing forms "in direct violation of the re­
quirements of the rules and forms . . .  to declare truthfully all assets and liabilities"); Bellew, 
35 F3d at 519-21 (stating that the defendant violated a "judicial order" by fraudulently filing 
forms that mandated truthful disclosure). 
25. See, e.g. , Saacks, 131 F3d at 546 (analogizing the "standing orders and standard 
forms" of the bankruptcy court to court orders); Michalek, 54 F.3d at 333 (same). 
26. See United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 226-28 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
process enhancement should only be applied where a defendant violates a court order); 
United States v. Rowe, 144 F3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that the district court, on re­
mand, should specify the order that the defendant violated if it still deemed a process en­
hancement appropriate); see also United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 
1997) (stating that the process enhancement does not seem to apply to abuse of process). 
27. See Rowe, 144 F3d at 23 (stressing that the district court needed to identify a spe­
cific order that the defendant violated before invoking the process enhancement); United 
States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 529-30 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); see also Thayer, 201 F.3d at 
228. 
28. See, e.g., Shadduck, 112 F3d at 529-30 (analyzing whether any bankruptcy forms 
constitute orders). The First Circuit explicitly declined to address the abuse of process ar­
gument in Shadduck because the district court had failed to reach this question and should 
be given the chance to address the issue on remand. See id. at 531. 
29. See Carrozzella, 105 F3d at 799-802 (stating that the process enhancement should be 
applied only where the defendant violates a specific court order or decree but failing to de-
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have concluded that the process enhancement should only be invoked 
where a bankruptcy fraud defendant violates a judicial or administra­
tive order or decree.30 
This Note argues that neither the abuse of process argument nor 
the analogy argument justifies applying the two-level process en­
hancement to bankruptcy fraud. Rather, sentences should only be en­
hanced under this provision when defendants violate legal instruments 
issued by courts or administrative agencies, such as orders or decrees. 
Part I explains why the abuse of process argument fails to justify ap­
plying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. Part II discusses 
why the analogy argument also does not justify enhancing the sen­
tence of a defendant convicted of bankruptcy fraud under the process 
enhancement. Part III contends that allowing courts to apply the pro­
cess enhancement to bankruptcy fraud regardless of whether the de­
fendant violated an order and based solely on a desire for proportion­
ate sentencing undermines the policy of the Guidelines. Part IV 
argues that courts that wish to punish a bankruptcy fraud defendant's 
abuse of process should sentence bankruptcy fraud under section 
2Jl.3, the Guidelines' base offense provision for perjury, instead of 
under section 2Fl.1. This Note concludes that sentencing bankruptcy 
fraud defendants under section 2Jl.3, as opposed to adopting a broad 
definition of "process" in section 2Fl.1(b)(4)(B) or applying the pro­
vision by analogy, would best fulfill the Sentencing Commission's 
goals of uniform and proportional sentencing. 
I. THE ABUSE OF PROCESS ARGUMENT FOR APPLYING SECTION 
2F1.1(b )( 4)(B) TO BANKRUPTCY FRAUD 
A majority of the circuits that have examined the application of 
the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud have read the word 
"process" broadly and interpreted the phrase "violation of process" to 
mean abuse of process.31 These courts have held that reading "proc­
ess" in the process enhancement broadly to include submitting a false 
cide the issue because the defendant's conduct was more appropriately punished under the 
enhancement provision for abusing a position of trust). The Third Circuit has also rejected 
the abuse of process argument. See Thayer, 201 F3d at 227-'2J!.. 
30. See supra notes 26-29. 
31. See, e.g. , United States v. Guthrie, 144 F3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding judi­
cial process to inciude bankruptcy proceedings); United States v. Webster, 125 F3d 1024, 
1036 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he knowing concealment of assets . . .  constitutes a violation of a 
judicial process • . . .  "); United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(holding the district court's interpretation of judicial process which included judicial pro­
ceedings to be more reasonable than linrlting the term to judicial instruments, such as sub­
poenas); United States v. Welch, 103 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the process 
enhancement applies to violations of bankruptcy proceedings); United States v. Michalek, 54 
F.3d 325, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding violation of process to mean abuse of process); United 
States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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bankruptcy petition is more reasonable than reading "process" nar­
rowly.32 They have reached this conclusion, however, with little or no 
analysis of the text of, or commentary to the process enhancement.3  
This Part analyzes the abuse of process argument as a basis for ap­
plying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. Section I.A dis­
cusses why the text of the process enhancement would favor reading 
"process" narrowly rather than broadly. Section I.B argues that the 
commentary to the process enhancement contradicts the inference 
that the Sentencing Commission intended "violation of any judicial ... 
process" to mean abuse of process. This Part concludes that both the 
text of and the commentary to the process enhancement support the 
position that the Sentencing Commission intended the process en­
hancement to be applied only to misconduct in contravention of a 
court or administrative order or decree. 
A. The Text ofSection2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) 
An analysis of the text of the process enhancement demonstrates 
several flaws in the majority's logic. First, the use of "violation" in the 
phrase "violation of any judicial or administrative ... process" indi­
cates that process should be read narrowly. The word "violation" 
"strongly suggests the existence of a command or warning followed by 
disobedience."34 Courts, for example, commonly describe conduct in 
contravention of a preexisting court order as a violation.35 
By contrast, the conduct that courts characterize as an abuse of 
process focuses more on the misuse of the power and time of the court 
rather than a violation of a particular rule.36 The court in United States 
32 See Guthrie, 144 F.3d at 1010; Messner, 107 F.3d at 1457; Michalek, 54 F.3d at 332-33; 
Lloyd, 947 F.2d at 340. 
33. See infra note 47. 
34. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 800; see also United States v. Linville, 10 F.3d 630, 633 {9th 
Cir. 1993) (stating that although "[e]veryone is presumed to know the law," the Sentencing 
Commission intended the enhancement to apply to criminals with "the aggravated mental 
state that can be found when a special law in the form of a formal order, injunction or decree 
is violated"). 
35. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. v. Patch, No. 99-1754, 2000 WL 39123, at *1 (1st Cir. Jan. 
24, 2000) (stating that the state "violated bankruptcy court orders"); United States v. 
Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 885 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "Deutsch had held himself out as an 
attorney in violation of a judicial order"); In re Howe, 800 F.2d 1251, 1252 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(stating that a court may issue sanctions to limit "violations of the judicial process" such as 
discovery orders). 
36. See, e.g. , Washington v. DEA, 183 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[t)he 
essence of a claim for abuse of process is the use of process for some collateral purpose" (in­
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Meyer v. Conlon, 162 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(listing an ulterior purpose and the willful, improper use of the process as the essential ele­
ments of abuse of process); Lunsford v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 653, 
655 (9th Cir. 1994) (defining abuse of process similarly); Stegall v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 996 F. 
Supp. 1060, 1070 (D. Kan. 1998) (stating that "[t]he gist of [abuse of process] is the misuse or 
misapplication of process, justified in itself, for an end other than that which it was designed 
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v. Lloyd, for example, held that the defendant abused the bankruptcy 
court process because he "sought protection from his creditors under 
the shelter of bankruptcy ... and [then] hindered the orderly admini­
stration of the bankruptcy estate," not because he violated any par­
ticular rule or form.37 Other examples of abuses of process include use 
of pleadings to coerce payment of a debt or surrender of property un­
related to the litigation, unreasonable use of force or excessive at­
tachment to enforce a right of action, use of process to gain a collat­
eral advantage extraneous to the merits, and improper use of a 
subpoena.38 Thus, disrupting "process" in its broad sense would be 
more appropriately described as an abuse rather than a violation. 
Reading "process" in the process enhancement broadly would also 
contravene the restrictive language in the process enhancement that 
indicates that the provision only covers violations of process "not ad­
dressed elsewhere in the guidelines."39 Section 3Cl.1 provides an en­
hancement for obstruction of justice, including the submission of false 
documents to a court.40 Many courts have applied section 3Cl.1 to 
enhance the sentences of defendants who have submitted false docu­
ments in the context of a formal hearing.41 Bankruptcy fraud involves 
to accomplish"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 10 (defining "abuse of proc­
ess"). 
37. 947 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991). In fact, the court specifically stated that "Lloyd 
did not violate a specific judicial order, injunction, or decree." Id. 
38. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Weible, 92 F3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United 
States v. LaSalle Nat'! Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 314 (1978) (using a court's sunrmons power for an 
improper purpose); Washington, 183 F.3d at 875 (using process for some collateral purpose 
constitutes abuse of process); Podolsky v. Alma Energy Corp., 143 F3d 364, 372 (7th Cir. 
1998) (stating that under Illinois Jaw a claim for abuse of process requires an ulterior pur­
pose and "some act in the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the 
proceedings"); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 
F.2d 1525, 1529 {9th Cir. 1991) {making " 'misrepresentations . . .  in the adjudicatory proc­
ess' " and pursuing" 'a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims' " (quoting California Motor 
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 {1972))), affd, 508 U.S. 49; In re 
Spectee Group, Inc., 185 B.R 146, 155 {Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) {bad faith filing of a bank­
ruptcy petition for the sole purposes of delaying payment to its creditors). 
39. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.l{b){4)(B). The commentary to section 2Fl.1 reiterates 
that the process enhancement provision "does not apply to conduct addressed elsewhere in 
the guidelines." Id. § 2Fl.1 application note 6. 
40. See id. § 3Cl.1 (providing an enhancement where "the defendant willfully ob­
structed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during 
the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense"). Applica­
tion notes 4{c) and 4(f) to section 3Cl.1 state that the provision applies to "producing or at­
tempting to produce a false, altered, or counterfeit document or record during an official 
investigation or judicial proceeding" and to "providing materially false information to a 
judge or magistrate." Id. § 3Cl.1 application notes 4{c) & 4{f). But see Lloyd, 941 F.2d at 
340 (stating that section 3Cl.1 should be used only for "obstructive conduct that occurs 
'during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the [charged] offense' " (citing 
USSG, supra note 3, § 3Cl.1) {alteration in original)). 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Luca, 183 F3d 1018, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
enhancement for willfully submitting false or misleading documents in response to an inves­
tigative subpoena); United States v. Case, 180 F3d 464, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding 
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an analogous abuse of process.42 Since reading "process" in the proc­
ess enhancement broadly would make section 3C1.1 redundant, courts 
should interpret "process" narrowly. Moreover, where possible, stat­
utes should be read in a way to minimize the overlap between differ­
ent provisions.43 
Finally, if the Sentencing Commission had meant to include abuse 
of process as a ground for enhancement, they would have used lan­
guage consistent with this intent. Congress, for example, regularly 
uses the term "abuse of process" in its statutes.44 Although the Sen­
tencing Commission does not use the term "abuse of process" in the 
Guidelines, it does use terms analogous to "abuse of process."45 
Therefore, the use of the phrase "violation of process" by the Sen­
tencing Commission favors reading "process" narrowly.46 
B. The Commentary to Section 2Fl.1 (b )(4)(B) 
The commentary to the process enhancement, which consists of 
application notes and background, also indicates that the Sentencing 
Commission did not intend the process enhancement as a catchall 
provision to punish abuse of process.47 Commentary provides impor-
enhancement for submitting false Internal Revenue Service forms to a court); United States 
v. Williams, Nos. 95-50402 & 95-50413, 1996 WL 506190, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1996) (up­
holding enhancement for producing false documents in a grand jury investigation); Lloyd, 
947 F.2d at 340 (stating that "Lloyd did violate a judicial process by fraudulently concealing 
assets from bankruptcy court officers"). 
42 See, e.g., United States v. Mcintosh, 124 F.3d 1330, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 1997) (indi­
cating that the defendant's "alleged omissions from the schedules and reports required in 
connection with [the chapter 11] petition formed the basis" of the bankruptcy fraud charge); 
Lloyd, 941 F.2d at 340 (stating that "Lloyd did violate a judicial process by fraudulently con­
cealing assets from bankruptcy court officers"). 
43. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) 
(stating that "[o]ur cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to 
render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment"). 
44. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (using "abuse of process"); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (us­
ing "obstruction of proceedings"); 19 U.S.C. § 1337( c) (using "abuse of process"); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(5)(B) (same). 
45. See, e.g., USSG, supra note 3, § 3Cl.1 (applying to obstruction of justice); id. § 2J1.2 
(same); see also id. § 2Jl.2 background (using "obstructing a civil or administrative pro­
ceeding"); id. § 3Cl.1 application note 4(c) (listing "producing or attempting to produce a 
false, altered, or counterfeit document or record during [a] . . .  judicial proceeding" as an 
obstruction of justice); id. application note 4(f) (listing "providing materially false informa­
tion to a judge or magistrate"). 
46. See United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 530 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing the back­
ground commentary to the process enhancement provision); see also United States v. 
Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 799-801 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that while the section adjusts the 
offense level based on a violation of judicial process, "abuse" of process seems to have crept 
into the lexicon of the process enhancement through the case law of other circuits). 
47. Most courts that have held that section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) applies to bankruptcy fraud 
have not examined the background or application notes to the provision. See, e.g. , United 
States v. Guthrie, 144 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1998) (electing to follow the majority position 
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tant guidance in interpreting the Guidelines' provisions.48 The Su­
preme Court has held that commentary "must be given 'controlling 
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula­
tion' " and that even unambiguous provisions should be applied in 
light of commentary. 49 Unfortunately, many of the courts that have 
held that section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) applies to bankruptcy fraud have not 
examined the background or application notes to the provision. 5 0  
Application notes constitute one type of commentary.5 1 The appli­
cation notes to the process enhancement indicate that it should be 
used to increase the sentences of defendants who commit fraud that 
violates a preexisting legal instrument proscribing the misconduct.5 2 
Application note 6 states that courts should apply the process en­
hancement "[i]f it is established that an entity the defendant con­
trolled was a party to the prior proceeding, and the defendant had 
knowledge of the prior decree or order."5 3 As an illustration, the ap­
plication note refers to "a defendant whose business was previously 
enjoined from selling a dangerous product, but who nonetheless en­
gaged in fraudulent conduct to sell the product," as an individual 
whose sentence should be enhanced under this provision.5 4 This ex­
ample reinforces the conclusion that the process enhancement should 
because it found the reasoning of these courts to be persuasive); United States v. Messner, 
107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding the more reasonable interpretation of judicial 
process to include judicial proceedings despite acknowledging that "a textual argument may 
be made that the term 'process' refers only to 'a specific judicial mechanism such as a sub­
poena or summons' "); United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1995) (mak­
ing no mention of commentary except in reference to a variety of frauds covered by the 
fraud provision); Lloyd, 947 F.2d at 340 (finding a violation of judicial process by fraudulent 
concealment of assets from bankruptcy court officers but making no mention of the com­
mentary). One court has also suggested that because Black's Law Dictionary defines an 
"order" as a mandate and the bankruptcy rules mandate truthful disclosure, violating these 
rules constitutes a violation of an order. See United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518, 521 (11th 
Cir. 1994). The few courts that have mentioned the commentary do so only in passing, and 
with only a cursory analysis of its content. See, e.g., United States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540, 
544-46 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding against the defendant without analyzing the defendant's ar­
gument based on the commentary). 
48. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (stating that "[i]n determining whether a cir­
cumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sen­
tencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis­
sion"); USSG, supra note 3, § lBl.7 (stating that commentary "may interpret the guideline 
or explain how it is to be applied[,] ... may suggest circumstances which may warrant depar­
ture ... [and] may provide background information, including factors considered in promul­
gating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline"). 
49. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 44-45 (1993). 
50. See supra note 47. 
51. See, e.g., USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1. 
52 See id. application note 6. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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be used only if the defendant has acted in contravention of an admin­
istrative or court decree or order.ss 
Moreover, the absence of any other examples or discussion in the 
application notes regarding when courts should apply the process en­
hancement bolsters the conclusion that the Sentencing Commission 
meant to limit application of the provisions to situations in which a de­
fendant has violated a court or administrative order or decree.s6 If the 
Commission had intended the provision to cover abuse of process, it 
would have incorporated examples in the commentary indicative of 
this intent.s7 The failure of the Sentencing Commission to include 
such examples in the application notes to the process enhancement 
suggests that it did not intend abuse of process to fall within the pur­
view of this provision.ss 
In addition, where the Sentencing Commission intends the applica­
tion notes to provide an illustrative but nonbinding interpretation of a 
provision, it usually expresses this intent explicitly.59 The application 
notes to section 3Cl.l, for example, repeatedly indicate that the enu­
merated examples should not be considered exhaustive.60 By contrast, 
the application note to the process enhancement does not contain any 
such qualification.61 The Sentencing Commission's inclusion of discus­
sion related only to violations of court orders or decrees in the appli­
cation notes to the process enhancement indicates that it intended for 
courts to apply the provision only when a defendant violates an order 
or decree.62 
55. See id. The November 1, 1993 amendment to application note 6 also supports this 
conclusion. The amendment states that "[t]his subsection does not apply to conduct ad­
dressed elsewhere in the Guidelines; e.g., a violation of a condition of release or a violation 
of probation." Id. § 2Fl.1, 1993 amendments (reference omitted). That the Sentencing 
Commission chose as examples two provisions related to violations of legal instruments is­
sued by courts, as opposed to provisions punishing abuses of process, suggests that the 
Commission had legal instruments in mind when it used the word "process" in this context. 
56. See generally id. § 2Fl.1 application notes, background (giving only example and 
discussion that would support the narrow reading of "process"). 
57. The Sentencing Commission has explicitly used language analogous to abuse of pro­
cess in other parts of the Guidelines. See supra note 45. 
58. See USSG, supra note 3, § lBl.7. 
59. See, e.g., id. § 3El.1 application note 1 (indicating that the list includes appropriate 
but not exclusive factors to be considered by the court in determining whether to apply the 
provision); id. § 2Fl.1 application note 5 (listing "[e]xamples of conduct to which this factor 
applies" in order to demonstrate the scope of section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(A)); id. § 2G2.l applica­
tion note 2 (indicating that enumerated entities should be considered examples of parties 
subject to this enhancement). 
60. See id. § 3Cl.1 application note 3 (stating that application notes 4 and 5 only set 
forth examples); id. application note 4 (stating that application note 4 sets out a "non­
exhaustive list of examples"). 
61. See id. § 2Fl.l application note 6. 
62 See id. § lBl.7 (stating that "commentary . • .  may interpret the guideline or explain 
how it is to be applied"). 
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A second type of commentary is the background, which also pro­
vides important guidance in interpreting the Guidelines' provisions.63 
The background to the process enhancement buttresses the conclusion 
that the Sentencing Commission intended courts to apply this provi­
sion only where a defendant violates a formal legal instrument issued 
by a court. The Sentencing Commission indicated in the background 
to section 2Fl.1 that it included the process enhancement specifically 
to deter recidivist criminal misconduct, particularly in situations where 
courts have previously disciplined the defendant.64 Thus, the back­
ground to the process enhancement also supports the use of this provi­
sion to punish defendants who have violated a court order, and not 
simply to punish defendants for abuse of process. 
Further evidence of the Sentencing Commission's intent can be 
found in its narrow use of "process" in similar contexts in the com­
mentary. The commentary, for example, speaks of "judicial process or 
orders issued by federal, state, or local administrative agencies.''65 
Moreover, the placement of "process" in section 2F1.1(b )(4)(B) at the 
end of an enumeration that includes only specific types of judicial in­
struments issued after a formal proceeding reinforces the conclusion 
that "process" should be read to include only judicial instruments 
similar to "orders," "injunctions," or "decrees."66 Of course, the Sen­
tencing Commission might have intended "process" as a catchall term, 
63. See, e.g., id. (stating that commentary may be used to interpret a "guideline or ex­
plain how it is to be applied" and "provide background information, including factors con­
sidered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline" 
(emphasis added)); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (stating that "[i]n determining whether a cir­
cumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sen­
tencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis­
sion"). 
64. See USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 background (stating that "[a] defendant who has 
been subject to civil or administrative proceedings for the same or similar fraudulent con­
duct demonstrates aggravated criminal intent and is deserving of additional punishment"). 
65. Id.; see also id. § 5Dl.3(c)(4) (stating that the defendant should comply with "the 
terms of any court order or administrative process"). But see USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 
background (stating that "[d]iplomatic processes often must be used to secure testimony and 
evidence"). 
66. The canons ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis indicate that, absent language or 
commentary to the contrary, the specific enumeration in section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) restricts the 
meaning of process. "Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a 
specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the 
one with specific enumeration." Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 
499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). The canon noscitur a sociis holds that the meaning of a word in a 
series is affected by other words in the same series. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 694 (1995). Statutes commonly use "process" as 
a catchall term for legal instruments issued by a court in the context of a proceeding. See, 
e.g., 11 U.S.C.§ 105(a) (1994) (discussing a court-issued "order, process, or judgment"); 15 
U.S.C. § 260a(c) (discussing judicial action "by writ of injunction or by other process, man­
datory or otherwise, restraining against further violations"); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(2) (stating 
that courts may "issue such warrants or other process as may be required for enforcement"). 
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making the broader definition of "process" more reasonable.67 The 
similarity of the instruments enumerated on the list, however, supports 
the conclusion that even a catchall term should be limited by the 
common characteristics of the instruments mentioned by the Sen­
tencing Commission. 68 
In sum, the Sentencing Commission's use of "process" in the proc­
ess enhancement reflects its intent to define the term narrowly.69 
Moreover, the commentary to the process enhancement discusses 
"process" exclusively in its narrow sense.70 As such, courts should ap­
ply the process enhancement only when a defendant violates an order, 
injunction, decree, or a process issued by the court, such as a summons 
or mandate, not when a defendant engages in any conduct that can be 
described as abuse of process. 
II. THE A NALOGY A RGUMENT FOR APPLYING SECTION 
2Fl.1(b)(4)(B) TOBANKRUPTCYFRAUD 
Several federal courts have relied on the analogy argument as a 
justification for enhancing the sentences of bankruptcy fraud defen­
dants under the process enhancement.71 They have concluded that a 
defendant who commits bankruptcy fraud falls under the judicial pro­
cess language of the process enhancement, not because he has violated 
a court order, but because he has committed acts analogous to violat­
ing a court order or decree.72 These courts have equated several bank­
ruptcy rules and forms that mandate truthful and complete disclosure 
of assets and liabilities by debtors to court orders or decrees.73 Thus, 
although concealment of assets in a bankruptcy proceeding does not 
literally violate a court order or decree, several courts have held such 
67. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511-12 (1996) (reading term broadly as 
a catchall term because it seems consistent with legislative intent). 
68. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973) 
(stating that a catchall provision should be interpreted as "bringing within a statute catego­
ries similar in type to those specifically enumerated"). See also infra notes 91-97 and ac­
companying text for a discussion of the similarities among orders, injunctions, and decrees. 
69. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement 
Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (reading a statutory provision 
narrowly, in part because of the restrictive language in the provision); Western Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (same). 
70. See, e.g., United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1997) (indicating 
that the provision should be read narrowly). 
71. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
72 See id.; United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518, 519-21 (11th Cir. 1994). 
73. See, e.g., Bellew, 35 F.3d at 520-21 (analogizing bankruptcy forms and rules to a 
court order); see also Official Bankr. Form 1, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999) (requiring dis­
closure under penalty of perjury); Official Bankr. Form 6, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999) 
(same); Bankr. Rule 9011(b), 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999) (mandating good faith submis­
sion of the forms). 
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incomplete disclosure to be tantamount to violating a judicial process 
within the meaning of the process enhancement.74 
This Part analyzes the analogy argument for applying the process 
enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. Section II.A discusses why neither 
the text of nor the commentary to the process enhancement indicates 
that the Sentencing Commission intended that courts should have the 
discretion to apply it by analogy. Section II.B argues that courts 
should not apply the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud be­
cause fraudulent filing of bankruptcy disclosure forms does not mani­
fest the necessary aggravated criminal intent to apply the process en­
hancement. Section 11.C contends that applying the process 
enhancement to bankruptcy fraud constitutes impermissible double 
counting. This Part concludes that the analogy argument is an insuffi­
cient justification for applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy 
fraud. 
A. The Text of and Commentary to Section2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) 
The Sentencing Commission created the sentencing framework of 
the Guidelines to reduce judicial discretion and idiosyncratic sentenc­
ing decisions.75 As such, the Guidelines should generally be applied as 
written.76 This Section argues that courts should not apply the process 
enhancement by analogy because neither the text of nor the commen­
tary to the process enhancement manifests an intent to allow judicial 
discretion to do so. 
The process enhancement contains no language that manifests any 
intention of conferring discretion on courts to apply the provision to 
misconduct analogous to violations of judicial orders or decrees.77 The 
absence of an open-ended invitation for judicial discretion in the 
commentary to the process enhancement favors a narrower construc­
tion of the provision. The Sentencing Commission, for example, could 
74. See Bellew, 35 F.3d at 519-21. The Tenth Circuit in Michalek, when faced with a 
similar fact pattern, also held that a defendant's submission of bankruptcy forms with 
fraudulent information violated bankruptcy rules requiring full and complete disclosure. See 
United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 333 {7th Cir. 1995). 
75. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A{3) (stating that broad discretion results in courts 
"exercis[ing] their discretionary powers in different ways" and causes "the wide disparity 
that Congress established the Commission to reduce"). 
76. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(l) (stating that the Sentencing Commission promulgated "de­
tailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal 
crimes"); id. ch. 1, pt. A(2) (stating that "sentencing court[s] must select a sentence from 
within the guideline range" except in atypical cases); see also supra note 9. 
77. Compare, e.g., USSG, supra note 3, § 2X5.1 ("If the offense is a felony or Class A 
misdemeanor for which no guideline expressly has been promulgated, apply the most analo­
gous offense guideline."); id. § 2M1.1(a)(2) (directing courts to apply "the offense level ap­
plicable to the most analogous offense"); id. § 2K1.4(c)(l) ("If death resulted, or the offense 
was intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, apply the most analogous guideline 
from Chapter Two, Part A . . . . ") ; id. § 211.1 (referencing section 2X5.1). 
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have enunciated a wider range of relevant circumstances where courts 
should apply the process enhancement or could have used broader 
language in the text of the provision.78 Moreover, even if similar to 
court orders, preexisting disclosure forms should not be read into the 
language of the process enhancement because the section specifically 
lists several types of legal documents but omits general disclosure 
forms.79 
In fact, where the Sentencing Commission intends to give sen­
tencing courts discretion to apply a provision by analogy, the commen­
tary typically reflects this intent.80 The commentary to section 3C1.1, 
for example, states that "[o]bstructive conduct can vary widely in na­
ture, degree of planning, and seriousness" and offers examples to "as­
sist the court in determining whether application of this adjustment is 
warranted in a particular case."81 Where the text and commentary do 
not indicate that the Sentencing Commission intended to allow a pro­
vision to be applied by analogy, sentencing courts should apply the 
Guidelines as written. 
B. Aggravated Criminal Intent in the Context of 
Section 2Fl.1 (b) (4)(B) 
The commentary to the process enhancement indicates that the 
Sentencing Commission intended courts to apply the process en­
hancement only where a defendant engages in "fraudulent conduct 
[that] demonstrates aggravated criminal intent."82 Aggravated crimi­
nal intent describes a mens rea beyond simply knowing disobedience 
78. See United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 779-800 (2d Cir. 1997); cf. United 
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (analyzing the definition of "enterprise" 
based on its context). 
79. See Dugan v. Smerwick Sewerage Co., No. CIV.A.95-C3223, 1996 WL 535306, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1996) (stating that the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius means 
"when specific items are listed without any more general or inclusive terms, other items, al­
though sinillar in kind are excluded"}. 
80. See, e.g., USSG, supra note 3, § 2El.1 application note 2 (stating that "the offense 
level corresponding to the most analogous federal offense is to be used"); id. § 2K2.1 appli­
cation note 14 (stating that "if death results" courts should sentence the defendant "under 
the most analogous guideline from Chapter Two, Part A, Subpart 1 (Homicide)"); id. § 
2M1.1 background (stating that "(t]he guideline contemplates imposition of the maximum 
penalty in the most serious cases, with reference made to the most analogous offense guide­
line in lesser cases"). 
81. Id. § 3C1.1 application note 3 (referring to examples laid out in application notes 4 
and5). 
82 Id. § 2Fl.1 background; see, e.g., United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 530 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (stating that the co=entary indicates that "the enhancement was meant to apply 
to defendants who have demonstrated a heightened mens rea"); United States v. Linville, 10 
F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing the co=entary for the proposition that the process en­
hancement was intended as an "extra" penalty for crimes of " 'aggravated criminal intent' "). 
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of the law.83 It describes the mindset of a defendant who "commits a 
fraud in contravention of "judicial process or orders issued by federal, 
state, or local administrative agencies."84 Courts that have applied the 
process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud have attempted to infer ag­
gravated criminal intent from the serious ramifications of the crime.85 
These courts have equated the "standing orders and standard forms" 
of the bankruptcy court that require "complete and truthful disclo­
sure" with court orders.86 This Section argues that fraudulent filing of 
bankruptcy forms does not demonstrate aggravated criminal intent. 
Bankruptcy fraud does not inherently involve aggravated criminal 
intent.87 Violation of a court order, injunction, or decree does not con­
stitute an element Of bankruptcy fraud.88 An mdividual need Only 
make a knowingly false statement about a material fact made under 
penalty of perjury and in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.89 
Moreover, the criminal culpability of falsely filing bankruptcy dis­
closure forms falls short of the culpability inherent in the violation of 
court orders, injunctions, or decrees.90 Judges issue orders and decrees 
83. See id.; see also United States v. Gunderson, 55 F.3d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that the enhancement applies to a defendant who has had a previous warning); 
Linville, 10 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the enhancement should be limited to 
defendants who violate a preexisting order or decree). 
84. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 background; see also Shadduck, 112 F.3d at 529 (stating 
that a defendant demonstrates aggravated criminal intent by "violating a prior order specifi­
cally enjoining the defendant . . .  from engaging in the fraudulent conduct" (emphasis re­
moved)); United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that applica­
tion of the process enhancement is limited to situations in which defendants "commit their 
fraud in the face of some type of official warning or order directed specifically to them"); 
Linville, 10 F.3d at 633 (finding aggravated criminal intent where the defendant violates a 
"special law in the form of a formal order, injunction or decree"). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Kubick, 199 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
the defendant demonstrated "aggravated criminal intent" because his "abuse of the bank­
ruptcy process [made him] more culpable" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that such 
violations "involve a higher level of culpability" because of the serious ramifications of 
bankruptcy fraud). 
86. United States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Michalek, 54 F.3d 
at 333; United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518, 520 (11th Cir. 1994). 
87. See Shadduck, 112 F.3d at 530 (stating that not all bankruptcy fraud cases involve 
aggravated criminal intent); Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 800 (stating that bankruptcy fraud de­
fendants who are trustees do not demonstrate aggravated criminal intent because the "com­
mand" they violate is "not specifically directed" at them). 
88. See, e.g., Oymer v. United States, No. 95-55941, 1996 WL 393510, at *l (9th Cir. July 
9, 1996) (listing the elements of bankruptcy fraud as "(1) the existence of bankruptcy pro­
ceedings; (2) that the defendant made a statement in the bankruptcy proceeding under pen­
alty of perjury; (3) that the statement was false; (4) that the statement pertained to a mate­
rial fact; and (5) that the statement was knowingly and fraudulently made" (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 152)). 
89. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West Supp. 1999); 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); see also Clymer, 
1996 WL 393510, at *1 (listing elements of bankruptcy fraud). 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 228 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Bankruptcy 
Rules and Forms have more in common with statutes and procedural rules of general appli-
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in the context of formal adversarial hearings that parties are com­
pelled to attend. 91 Orders or decrees are directed at specific parties 
and dictate compliance without the parties' consent. 92 Courts use 
these formalities to convey the gravity of orders and decrees. 9 3  Fur­
thermore, where the defendant's offense violates a court order or de­
cree, a court has often already determined that the defendant has en­
gaged in some illegal conduct. 9 4  In fact, many courts have interpreted 
the process enhancement to apply only where defendants receive prior 
notice. 95 At a minimum, the order "indicate[s] in specific terms what 
[the named] parties are required to do."96 Thus, violating an order in 
this context demonstrates aggravated criminal intent because it in­
volves not just illegal conduct, but illegal conduct that a court has spe­
cifically forbidden a party from undertaking. 97 
The fraudulent filing of generalized disclosure forms lacks many of 
the characteristics that make violating a court order or decree a crime 
cation than with orders of the court . . . .  "); Shadduck, 112 F.3d at S29-30 {lack of specificity 
of the bankruptcy court's disclosure requirements prevent finding of aggravated intent for 
violation of such existing rules); Carrozzella, lOS F.3d at 800 {full disclosure requirement not 
specifically directed at the defendant); United States v. Gunderson, SS F.3d 1328, 1333 (7th 
Cir. 199S) (upholding enhancement where defendant violates a "court-directed course of 
conduct" rather than "general laws against fraudulent conduct"). 
91. See United States v. Gist, 79 F.3d S2, S3-S4 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Linville, 
10 F.3d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1993). 
92 See Thayer, 201 F.3d at 228; Shadduck, 112 F.3d at S29; Gist, 79 F.3d at S3-S4; 
Linville, 10 F.3d at 632-33; see, e.g., Official Bankr. Form 12, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999) 
("Order and Notice for Hearing on Disclosure Statement"); Official Bankr. Form 13, 11 
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999) ("Order Approving Disclosure Statement and Fixing Time for 
Filing Acceptances or Rejections of Plan, Combined with Notice Thereof'). 
93. See Linville, 10 F.3d at 632-33 (discussing the importance of the formalities sur­
rounding the issuance of orders, injunctions and decrees in conveying the gravity of the pro· 
hibition). 
94. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 125 F.3d 401, 404-0S (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the 
defendant had sold fraudulent protnissory notes in violation of a consent decree); 
Gunderson, SS F.3d at 1333 (noting that the defendant had violated a court order proscribing 
his conduct); United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 88S (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the de· 
fondant had held himself out as an attorney in violation of a court order that had been issued 
by a judge in the course of an earlier critninal trial of the defendant). 
9S. See Carrozzella, lOS F.3d at 800 (interpreting the enhancement to apply only to 
those defendants who act in contravention of an existing order); Gunderson, SS F.3d at 1333 
(noting the importance of the defendant's having a previous warning); see also USSG, supra 
note 3, § 2Fl.1 background (stating that "[a] defendant who has been subject to civil or ad· 
ministrative proceedings for the same or sitnilar fraudulent conduct demonstrates aggra· 
vated critninal intent" because he has "not conform[ed] with the requirements of judicial 
process or orders"). 
96. Thayer, 201 F.3d at 228; see also United States v. Mohammad, S3 F.3d 1426, 1437 
{7th Cir. 199S) (stating that the court had ordered the defendant not to sell assets). 
97. See Burke, 125 F.3d at 40S (stating that the defendant had not only sold fraudulent 
securities but had also committed the separate offense of doing so in contravention of a con· 
sent decree); Gunderson, SS F.3d at 1333 (stating that a defendant shows aggravated criminal 
intent where he "defies a specific court-directed course of conduct"). 
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of aggravated criminal intent.98 In most cases, parties voluntarily 
complete bankruptcy disclosure forms and voluntarily file them with 
the court.99 The disclosure forms consist of generic documents with 
generalized warnings given to all individuals filing for bankruptcy.100 
Such forms generally do not emanate from a formal hearing where the 
court has compelled the attendance of the party seeking to file bank­
ruptcy.101 Moreover, the bankruptcy rules and forms do not "indicate 
in specific terms what . . .  parties are required to do."102 
The bankruptcy disclosure forms do require the filer to sign a dec­
laration under penalty of perjury as to the truthfulness of the matters 
within the petition.103 Such a declaration, standing alone, however, 
does not provide these documents with the gravity of court orders in 
this context because it involves neither the formalities surrounding the 
issuance of a court order or decree, nor a specific command from the 
court not to engage in a particular course of conduct.104 The declara­
tion and signature simply create and inform the declarant of a legal 
obligation.105 Thus, courts have not applied the process enhancement 
to the fraudulent filing of generalized forms such as tax returns and 
employment-eligibility verification forms that require a similar decla-
98. See, e.g., Linville, 10 F.3d at 632-33 (holding that defendanfs violation of USDA 
letters and notice warning her to cease her violation did not merit the process enhancement 
because they did not involve formalities analogous to those used by the court in issuing a 
court order); United States v. Scarano, g-]5 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that gener­
alized bail conditions do not constitute judicial orders within the meaning of the process en­
hancement). 
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (indicating that bankruptcy proceedings commence when 
the debtor voluntarily files a petition with the bankruptcy court). 
100. Form Number 1, which a petitioner must file in order to initiate the proceedings, 
contains language that the named petitioner "declare[s] under penalty of perjury that the 
information provided in th[e] petition is true and correct." Official Bankr. Form 1, 11 
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999). Form Number 6, a separate schedule of assets and liabilities, 
similarly requires complete disclosure, "under [p]enalty of [p]erjury." Official Bankr. Form 
6, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999). Such forms require the signature of the petitioner as an 
affirmation that the party has made inquiry to the best of its ability and has complied in good 
faith. See Bankr. Rule 9011(a), 11 U.S.C.A (West Supp. 1999). 
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). Although bankruptcy proceedings may also be initiated 
involuntarily, most of the published cases discussing the application of section 
2F1.l(b)(4)(B) to bankruptcy fraud involve involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., 
United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the defendant filed 
bankruptcy petitions to protect his business and assets); United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 
340 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the defendant filed his Chapter 11 petition). 
102. United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 228 (3d Cir. 1999). 
103. See Official Bankr. Form 1, 11 U.S.C (1994); Official Bankr. Form 6 (1994); Official 
Bankr. Form 9, 11 U.S.C (1994). 
104. See United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 19g-]); Sun World, Inc. 
v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.RD. 384, 389-90 (E.D. Cal. 1992); see also supra notes 90-98 and 
accompanying text. 
105. See United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 530 (1st Cir. 19g-]). 
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ration..106 Applying the process enhancement to violations of general 
disclosure forms would "subject every recipient of . . .  official notifica­
tions and warnings" to a penalty that the Sentencing Commission in­
tended to reserve for acts of fraud committed \vith an "aggravated 
criminal intent.m07 
The application of the aggravated criminal intent standard in non­
bankruptcy contexts buttresses the conclusion that courts should not 
use the process enhancement to punish all bankruptcy fraud defen­
dants. Outside of the bankruptcy context, courts have found the req­
uisite aggravated criminal intent where the defendant violates a pre­
existing court order or some other legal instrument.108 The Second 
Circuit, for example, upheld application of the process enhancement 
to the sentence of a defendant who repeatedly represented himself as 
a lawyer despite a court order prohibiting him from perpetrating this 
fraud.109 By contrast, criminals who violate a nonspecific prohibition 
such as generalized bail conditions or United States Department of 
Agriculture ("USDA") warnings have been held to lack aggravated 
criminal intent.110 These cases draw a distinction between the criminal 
intent of a defendant who violates a generalized warning that applies 
to a broad range of people, and a specific order, decree, or process 
that is directed specifically at the defendant and involves a previous 
finding by the court that the defendant engaged in fraudulent con­
duct.111 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, No. 96-1326, 1997 WL 43351, at *1 (2d Cir. 
1997) (rejecting application of enhancement to filing of false accounts in probate court); 
United States v. Fritzson, 979 F.2d 21, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1992) {failing to apply enhancement to 
defendant who filed false tax returns). 
107. United States v. Linville, 10 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting the background 
commentary to the process enhancement provision); see also United States v. Gist, 79 F.3d 
52, 53-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[u]nder U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(B) . • .  (t]he defendant 
must have 'knowledge of the prior decree or order' " (quoting USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 
application note 5)); United States v. Gunderson, 55 F.3d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). 
108. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 54 F.3d 394, 403 (7th Cir. 1995) (approving a pro­
cess enhancement based on defendant's violation of an FI'C injunction by selling litho­
graphs); United States v. Paccione, 751 F. Supp. 368, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1990} Gustifying a proc­
ess enhancement where defendant transported illegal waste and operated an illegal landfill 
in violation of injunction). 
109. See United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883-85 (2d Cir. 1993); see also United 
States v. Eve, 984 F.2d 701, 703 (6th Cir. 1993} (approving a process enhancement for a de­
fendant who obtained a false social security number to operate a motor vehicle in contraven­
tion of a court order). 
110. See Linville, 10 F.3d at 631. 
111. See, e.g., Gist, 79 F.3d at 55-56 (distinguishing between an informal administrative 
warning and a judicial injunction that prohibited the defendant from engaging in her 
fraudulent activities); United States v. Scarano, 975 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
"the Sentencing Commission did not intend to include general bail conditions among the 
judicial orders covered by section 2Fl.1 "). 
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Nor do the serious ramifications of the abuse of process caused by 
bankruptcy fraud, standing alone, demonstrate aggravated criminal 
intent. Many courts that have held fraudulent filing of bankruptcy 
forms to be punishable under 2Fl.1(b)(4)(B) argue that the crime 
demonstrates a higher level of culpability than other types of fraud be­
cause of its serious ramifications.112 The commentary to the process 
enhancement, however, indicates that the provision should be used to 
punish recidivist conduct that manifests the requisite mens rea, not 
simply fraud with serious ramifications.113 Thus, even a defendant who 
commits bankruptcy fraud with an awareness of the impact of his 
crime on the bankruptcy system does not exhibit aggravated criminal 
intent within the meaning of the process enhancement, unless he does 
so in violation of a judicial order, decree, or process.114 
In sum, the process enhancement should only be invoked where 
the defendant commits a fraud despite an order issued by a court or an 
administrative entity directing him to cease the misconduct.115 Bank­
ruptcy fraud involves a knowingly false statement related to a material 
fact made under penalty of perjury and in the course of a bankruptcy 
proceeding.116 It does not necessarily involve aggravated criminal in­
tent. Of course, violating the rules and forms of the bankruptcy court 
is a reprehensible crime worthy of punishment.117 Courts should, how­
ever, refrain from enhancing the defendant's sentence under the proc­
ess enhancement unless the defendant demonstrates the "aggravated 
criminal intent which [the enhancement] was designed to redress."118 
Therefore, unless a bankruptcy judge enters a pertinent order, decree, 
or injunction directing a party to disclose property, merely violating 
112 See, e.g., United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the 
enhancement ought to apply because of the defendant's abuse of the bankruptcy process); 
United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991) (same). 
113. See USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 application note 6 (stating that section 
2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) should be applied "[i]f it is established that an entity the defendant con­
trolled was a party to the prior proceeding, and the defendant had knowledge of the prior 
decree or order, this provision applies even if the defendant was not a specifically named 
party in that prior case"); supra note 64; see also United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 
530 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the commentary requires knowledge of the prior order or 
decree). 
114. See, e.g., USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 application note 6 (stating that the provision 
applies to a party with knowledge of the prior decree or order); Shadduck, 112 F.3d at 530 
(stating that the defendant needs the required "mens rea"); Linville, 10 F.3d at 633 (de­
scribing aggravated criminal intent as a "mental state"). Many courts, however, apply the 
enhancement without ever considering the defendant's mental state. See, e.g., Michalek, 54 
F.3d at 332. 
115. See supra note 113. 
116. See supra note 88. 
117. See infra Part IV. 
118. Shadduck, 112 F.3d at 530. But see United States v. Cheek, 69 F.3d 231, 233 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (the fact that enhancement might apply in most cases of bankruptcy fraud does 
not demonstrate the inappropriateness of enhancement). 
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the general rules or forms of the bankruptcy court does not create a 
sufficient basis to adjust a defendant's sentence upward under the pro­
cess enhancement.119 
C. The Analogy Argument Permits Double Counting 
Double counting occurs when a court sentences a defendant or en­
hances the sentence of a defendant under one provision of the Guide­
lines, and subsequently enhances the defendant's sentence based on 
the same conduct punished in the first instance.120 This Section exam­
ines the problem of double counting in sentencing and argues that 
courts double count when they enhance a bankruptcy fraud defen­
dant's sentence under section 2F.1(b)(4)(B) for abuse of the bank­
ruptcy process. 
The Guidelines implicitly prohibit double counting.121 In a general 
sense, double counting would conflict with the Guidelines' goal of 
honest and proportional sentencing by allowing courts to punish the 
defendant several times for the same misconduct.122 The policy state­
ments to the Guidelines, for example, speak of the "defendant's actual 
conduct" as imposing a "natural limit" on a defendant's sentence.123 
Specific provisions within the Guidelines also reflect this intent.124 A 
court sentencing a defendant under the obstruction of justice base of­
fense, for example, may only apply the obstruction enhancement 
where the defendant's obstructive conduct is so aggravated that it ex-
119. See Shadduck, 112 F.3d at 529-30. 
120. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding dou­
ble counting when courts consider the same factor in setting the initial Guidelines range and 
in choosing to depart from that range); United States v. Lincoln, 956 F.2d 1465, 1471 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (finding double counting "when one instance . . .  of a defendant's conduct forms 
the basis for a conviction . . .  and is also employed to adjust one or more other sentences"). 
121. In fact, the Sentencing Commission drafted the Guidelines to elintinate one form of 
double counting: count manipulation stemming from multicount convictions. See USSG, 
supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a). The Guidelines, however, allow double counting where the 
Sentencing Commission has expressed such an intent. See id. § lBl.1 application note 4 
(stating that adjustments from different guideline sections are applied cumulatively). 
122. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a); see also United States v. Lamere, 980 F.2d 506, 517 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (stating that the Sentencing Commission realized that double counting is inconsis­
tent with proportional sentencing); United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 
1990) (same). 
123. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a). 
124. See, e.g., id. § 2Jl.3 application note 3 (stating that where the defendant is convicted 
for both perjury and the "underlying offense," the court should ensure that such treatment 
does not impermissibly double count); id. § 3Dl.2 application note 5 (stating that 
"[s]ubsection (c) provides that when conduct that represents a separate count • . •  is also a 
specific offense characteristic in or other adjustment to another count, the count represented 
by that conduct is to be grouped with the count to which it constitutes an aggravating fac­
tor . . .  [to prevent] 'double counting' of offense behavior"); id. § 5K2.7 policy statement 
(proscribing departures for actions inherent to the underlying offense). 
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ceeds that necessary to satisfy the basic elements of the underlying of­
fense.125 
Not surprisingly, many courts have interpreted the Guidelines to 
prohibit double counting unless the Sentencing Commission has ex­
pressed a contrary intent.126 In United States v. Greenfield, for exam­
ple, the Second Circuit held that enhancing a defendant's sentence for 
a leadership role, under section 3Bl.l, and for more than minimal 
planning, under section 2F1.l(b )(2), constituted double counting be­
cause the court based both enhancements on the same conduct.127 
Likewise, many courts have also interpreted the Guidelines to require 
that an enhancement relate to conduct beyond the essential elements 
of the base offense.128 
Applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud by analo­
gizing the defendant's failure to accurately disclose assets to a viola­
tion of a court order constitutes impermissible double counting. The 
central element of bankruptcy fraud consists of the knowing and 
fraudulent concealment of assets from the bankruptcy court.129 This 
nondisclosure is the conduct that several courts have analogized to 
violating a court order in order to apply the process enhancement.130 
125. See id. § 3Cl.1 application note 7 (stating that defendant's conduct should manifest 
obstruction exceeding that inherent in the underlying offense). 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 135 F.3d 257, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Dawson, 1 F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1993); Lamere, 980 F.2d at 517; Werlinger, 894 F.2d at 
1017. 
127. 44 F.3d 1141, 1146 & n3 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the court based both enhance­
ments on the defendant's involvement in extensive planning and preparation); see also 
United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing the district court's appli­
cation of an obstruction of justice enhancement in part because the conduct underlying the 
enhancement also formed the basis of the base offense). Neither case involved an enhance­
ment provision explicitly condoning double counting. 
128. See, e.g., United States v. Kaster, No. 97-3210, 1998 WL 78995, at *1 (7th Cir. Feb. 
19, 1998) (upholding enhancement under section 2J13(b)(2) because defendant's perjury 
resulted in a "substantial interference with the administration of justice"); United States v. 
Burke, 125 F3d 401, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the "base offense level did not take 
into account . . . that Burke sold the fraudulent securities while under a consent decree not 
to sell such securities"); Lamere, 980 F.2d at 517 (reversing a section 3Cl.1 enhancement for 
concealing evidence where the defendant's crinte of conviction included concealment of 
counterfeit currency). 
129. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West Supp. 1999); 18 U.S.C § 157 (1994); United States v. 
Webster, 125 F3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 152), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
1051 (1998); Metheany v. United States, 390 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1968); Burke v. Dowling, 
944 F. Supp. 1036, 1064-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540, 542, 546 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
the government based its case on the defendant's concealment of assets and false reports on 
the "Bankruptcy Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs,'' and then enhancing defen­
dant's sentence based on his violation of "standing orders and standard forms"); United 
States v. Michalek, 54 F3d 325, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that Michalek committed 
bankruptcy fraud by failing to disclose assets, and then upholding the enhancement of the 
defendant's sentence under section 2Fl.l(b)(3)(B) for violating the "rules and forms of the 
Bankruptcy Rules to declare truthfully all assets and liabilities"). 
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In United States v. Bellew,131 for example, the defendant pleaded guilty 
to two counts of bankruptcy fraud for "conceal[ing] assets by know­
ingly failing to list the assets in bankruptcy filings and knowingly fail­
ing to disclose the assets during bankruptcy hearings."132 The Elev­
enth Circuit subsequently upheld an upward adjustment of the 
defendant's sentence under the process enhancement for failing to dis­
close assets to the bankruptcy court by relying on the analogy argu­
ment.133 Thus, the court's application of the process enhancement in 
Bellew double counted the defendant's failure to disclose assets to the 
bankruptcy court. 
Although some courts have held that the Guidelines allow double 
counting where neither of the relevant provisions contains language 
proscribing the practice, they have limited this exception to separate 
enhancement provisions.134 Thus, courts engage in double counting 
where both the fraud charge and the process enhancement stem from 
a defendant's failure to disclose assets in a bankruptcy proceeding.135 
The only conduct that arguably falls under the process enhancement, 
defendant's fraudulent submission of disclosure documents, also forms 
the basis for the underlying fraud charge. Therefore, permitting 
courts to enhance the defendant's sentence based on this conduct 
would allow double counting in contravention of the intent of the Sen­
tencing Commission as manifested in the Guidelines. 
131. 35 F.3d 518 {11th Cir. 1994). 
132. Bellew, 35 F.3d at 519. 
133. See id. at 521. 
134. See, e.g., United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1315 {3d Cir. 1996) (stating that 
"[n]othing in the Guidelines indicates that § 3Bl.3 and § 2Fl.l{b){3){B) may not be applied 
in tandem"); United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670-71 {3d Cir. 1993) (holding that two en­
hancements may be applied to the same conduct unless the Guidelines explicitly state oth­
erwise); United States v. Rappaport, 999 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1993) {finding that en­
hancement of defendant's sentence under both USSG, § 3Bl.l{a) and USSG, § 
2Fl.l{b){2){A) was not double counting because the enhancements addressed different as­
pects of the defendant's misconduct); United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407, 418-19 {8th Cir. 
1993) {finding no double counting unless Guidelines forbid application of two sections). 
None of these cases, however, address the propriety of double counting via an enhancement 
provision punishing conduct accounted for in the base offense. Compare Lamere, 980 F.2d 
at 517 (reversing an enhancement). 
135. See, e.g., United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 {8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to im­
pose a section 3Cl.1 enhancement for bankruptcy fraud because concealing assets formed 
the basis of the defendant's fraud charge); see also Rappaport, 999 F.2d at 60-61 (stating that 
enhancements relate to conduct beyond that which underlies the base offense). But see 
United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1437 {7th Cir. 1995) {holding that application of 
the process enhancement to cases of bankruptcy fraud does not implicate double counting 
because the concealment forms the basis of the bankruptcy fraud charge, and the violation 
of "a specific judicial order or the judicial process" forms the basis of the enhancement). 
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ill. THE POLICY OF THE GUIDELINES 
This Part examines the policy rationales used by those courts that 
rely on the abuse of process argument and the analogy argument to 
justify applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. These 
courts have relied on a defendant's abuse of the bankruptcy process as 
a basis for applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud.136 
Because the process enhancement does not encompass abuse of proc­
ess, though, this factor cannot justify application of the enhancement 
provision to bankruptcy fraud. Moreover, relying on such utilitarian 
justifications contravenes the underlying policy of the Guidelines. 
This Part concludes that Congress or the Sentencing Commission, and 
not courts, should remedy any problems with the Guidelines. 
Many courts have justified applying the process enhancement to 
bankruptcy fraud because they claim that, unlike most fraud crimes, 
bankruptcy fraud inherently involves abuse of process.137 These courts 
consider a defendant's abuse of the bankruptcy process as a material 
characteristic that differentiates bankruptcy fraud from other section 
2F1.1 fraud crimes.138 Bankruptcy fraud, unlike many other forms of 
fraud, wastes judicial resources, hinders the administration of the 
bankruptcy estate, and misuses the automatic stay of the bankruptcy 
court.139 Section 2F1.1, however, does not include any enhancement 
provision that specifically punishes abuse of process.140 
The absence of an enhancement that accounts for this difference 
has troubled these judges not only because it violates their innate 
sense of fairness but also because they feel that it subverts the Guide­
lines' goal of proportional sentencing.141 One court characterized sec­
tion 2F1.1 as "a dragnet guideline that sweeps within its ambit a great 
number of offenses involving dishonesty . . .  that impact our society in 
a variety of ways."142 Without the process enhancement, defendants 
convicted of bankruptcy fraud would be subject to the same sentence 
136. See, e.g., supra note 85. 
137. See supra note 85. 
138. See Lloyd, 941 F.2d at 340 (identifying the defendant's abuse of process as a factor 
that differentiates him from other defendants convicted of fraud); United States v. Michalek, 
54 F.3d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 1994) (same). 
139. See Lloyd, 941 F.2d at 340 (stating that the defendant's sentence should be en­
hanced because he hindered the administration of the bankruptcy estate and misused the 
judicial stay); see also Michalek, 54 F.3d at 332 (agreeing with Lloyd). 
140. See USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1; see generally supra Part I (discussing why section 
2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) does not apply to abuses of process). 
141. See, e.g., Michalek, 54 F.3d at 331-32 ("The district court must make the punish­
ment fit the crime or, to be more precise, to reflect accurately the intent of the Congress with 
respect to the seriousness of each of the many proscribed acts . . . .  [B]ankruptcy fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152 . . .  deserve[s] greater punishment . . . .  "). 
142 Id. at 331. 
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as criminals who have committed fraud crimes that do not involve 
abuse of process.143 
Courts may also perceive a specific enhancement directed at such 
abuse of process to be an important deterrent, especially in light of the 
rapid spread of bankruptcy fraud. The Tenth Circuit in United States 
v. Messner,144 for example, characterized the process enhancement as 
essential to "protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system."145 
These considerations probably served as the impetus for courts to ap­
ply the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud and explain its con­
tinuing application.146 
The policy statements to the Guidelines, however, undermine this 
justification for applying the Guidelines in a way that contravenes the 
intent of the Sentencing Commission.147 Policy statements comprise 
an important tool in interpreting the Guidelines.148 In fact, the Su­
preme Court has held that prohibitive policy statements should be 
treated as "an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable 
Guideline. "149 
The policy statements to the Guidelines indicate that the Commis­
sion imposed the rigid structure of the Guidelines to curb judicial dis­
cretion, to eliminate variations in the administration of sentences, and 
to maintain the balance it established between these competing 
goals.150 As part of the balance, Congress recognized the importance 
of preserving "sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences 
when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into 
account in the establishment of general sentencing practices."151 The 
Sentencing Commission, however, carefully cabined the discretion 
143. See id. at 331-32. 
144. 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997). 
145. Messner, 107 F.3d at 1457. 
146. See, e.g., United States v. Guthrie, 144 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that the enhancement serves to protect the bankruptcy system); Messner, 107 F.3d at 1457 
(same); see also United States v. Cheek, 69 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that bank­
ruptcy fraud is a more culpable crime than most frauds). 
147. See United States v. Crawford, 18 F.3d 1173, 1179 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Harriott, 976 F.2d 198, 202--03 (4th Cir. 1992). 
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 42 (1993); 
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 200-01 (1992); United States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 
831, 848 n.31 (11th Cir. 1998). 
149. Williams, 503 U.S. at 201. 
150. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3) ("The Commission had to balance the com­
parative virtues and vices of broad, simple categorization and detailed, complex subcategori­
zation, and within the constraints established by that balance, minimize the discretionary 
powers of the sentencing court."). 
151. 28 U.S.C.A. § 99l(b)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1999). 
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that it allowed in the Guidelines.152 Rather than granting courts broad 
discretion to account for such factors, the Commission built flexibility 
into the Guidelines by creating a detailed system that included "a list 
of relevant distinctions" for courts to invoke where necessary to guar­
antee appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differ­
ing severity.153 Thus, in order to effectuate the intent of the Sentenc­
ing Commission, the Guidelines must be applied as written.154 
Allowing sentencing courts to misapply Guidelines' provisions to 
achieve just ends would give courts the very discretion that the Sen­
tencing Commission sought to minimize in enacting the Guidelines.155 
Reading "process" broadly in the process enhancement, for example, 
would create the type of "simple, broad category" rejected by the Sen­
tencing Commission in drafting the Guidelines.156 Abuse of process 
includes any misuse of judicial or administrative proceedings, includ­
ing filing baseless complaints, making false representations to courts 
or agencies, and perhaps even filing false tax returns.157 Because of the 
breadth of the term and its imprecise definition, different courts might 
apply the term inconsistently.158 "Granting such broad discretion" to 
sentencing courts would result in sentencing disparities and "would 
152 See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 
92 (1996) (stating that Congress created the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing 
Commission to combat the "perceptionD that federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide 
range of sentences to offenders with sinillar histories, convicted of sinillar crimes, committed 
under sinillar circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Commission viewed 
broad judicial discretion as adverse to uniformity and proportionality because it increased 
the likelihood that different courts would interpret and apply the Guidelines in different 
ways. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). 
153. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3); see id. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b). The Sentencing 
Commission also allows for two other forms of judicial discretion. Where courts perceive a 
relevant distinction not reflected in the Guidelines, courts may depart from the Guidelines' 
sentencing procedure. See id.; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996) 
(stating that the court should depart when circumstances take a case "out of the Guideline's 
heartland"). Departure, however, should be reserved for the rare instances in which a court 
encounters a case with characteristics so unusual that the Sentencing Commission probably 
did not account for them in drafting the Guidelines. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96. The Sen­
tencing Commission also occasionally expresses its intent to give sentencing courts discretion 
in the text or commentary of Guidelines' provisions. See id. Despite realizing the need for 
some judicial discretion, the Commission still sought to "minimize the discretionary powers 
of the sentencing court" in the sentencing process. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). 
154. See supra note 76; see also United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d 198, at 203 (4th Cir. 
1992) (stating that courts must apply the Guidelines as written given the Sentencing Com­
mission's goal of sentencing uniformity). 
155. See Harriott, 976 F.2d at 203. 
156. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). 
157. See United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1997). 
158. See, e.g., id. at 800 (noting uncertainty as to whether certain types of conduct con­
stitute an abuse of process); United States v. Linville, 10 F3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (hold­
ing process to mean something akin to court or administrative orders); United States v. 
Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991) (construing process to mean the entirety of a bank­
ruptcy court's proceedings). 
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[be] contrary to the Commission's mandate."159 The ambiguity created 
by reading the process enhancement broadly, for example, has led to 
conflicting decisions, even within the same circuit, as to whether or not 
to apply the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud.160 Although 
reading "process" narrowly would not completely eliminate judicial 
discretion, it would minimize it. 
Allowing courts to apply the process enhancement by analogy 
would also violate the intent of the drafters. It would require courts to 
make the type of discretionary decisions that the Guidelines were de­
signed to minimize.161 A court sentencing a bankruptcy defendant, for 
example, would need to decide whether the underlying crime consists 
of conduct analogous to a violation of a court order and then, de­
pending on its conclusion, what additional enhancements, if any, the 
misconduct merited.162 In United States v. Spencer,163 for example, the 
Second Circuit upheld an enhancement under the process enhance­
ment by analogizing the negotiation and resultant agreement between 
the defendant and the Department of Transportation to an informal 
administrative process or decree.164 Such ad hoc analogies undermine 
consistent sentencing and lead to the disparate sentences that the Sen­
tencing Commission sought to eliminate.165 Unless the commentary or 
policy statements indicate an intent to allow courts to engage in such 
159. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (stating that the use of broad categories in the 
Guidelines would have given broad discretion to courts and would have resulted in the wide 
disparity in sentences that Congress intended to reduce). 
160. Compare United States v. Welch, 103 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying a pro­
cess enhancement to the sentence of a defendant convicted of bankruptcy fraud), with 
United States v. Lindholm, 24 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1994) (not applying a process en­
hancement to the sentence of a defendant convicted of bankruptcy fraud). 
161. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). Although such a determination does not 
seem innately difficult, the division of the circuits on the question of whether or not bank­
ruptcy fraud involves a violation of judicial process demonstrates the differences of opinion 
that can result where courts are allowed to apply a provision by analogy. Compare, e.g., 
United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518, 519-21 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding the violation of disclo­
sure forms to be analogous to violating a court order), with United States v. Shadduck, 112 
F.3d 523, 529-30 {1st Cir. 1997) (finding the violation of disclosure forms not to be analogous 
to violating court orders). 
162 Compare, e.g., United States v. Webster, 125 F.3d 1024, 1036 (7th Cir. 1997) (ap­
proving the application of the process enhancement on abuse of process grounds), with 
United States v. Rowe, 144 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting a process enhancement 
without evidence of a specific court order). Several district courts, presumably because they 
viewed the punishment as insufficient, also have attempted to increase the defendant's sen­
tence by invoking other provisions such as section 3Cl.1 for perjury. See, e.g., Webster, 125 
F.3d at 1036-37 (imposing both a process enhancement and a section 3Cl.1 enhancement). 
163. 129 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1388 (1998). 
164. See id. at 252-53. 
165. See generally USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (discussing how the Sentencing 
Commission viewed discretionary decisions as a source of pre-Guidelines sentencing dispar­
ity). 
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discretionary judgments, provisions should be interpreted to make the 
sentencing process as simple and uniform as possible.166 
A desire to reach a "proportionate" or "just" result does not pro­
vide a sufficient justification for manipulating the Guidelines.167 In 
fact, this type of judicial discretion fueled much of the criticism of pre­
Guidelines sentencing and played a significant role in Congress's even­
tual decision to enact the Sentencing Reform Act.168 The Guidelines 
represent the Sentencing Commission's balance of competing goals.169 
The failure of the Commission to account for abuse of process in the 
fraud provision suggests that either courts have not traditionally con­
sidered this factor important in sentencing or that the Commission 
purposefully excluded such an enhancement for some important rea­
son.170 The Sentencing Commission, for example, may not have in­
cluded an enhancement for abuse of process because it did not con­
sider bankruptcy fraud to be a uniquely culpable crime as compared to 
other fraud crimes punished under section 2Fl.1.171 The similar sen­
tences of various fraud crimes punished under section 2F1.1 support 
the conclusion that Congress might not consider bankruptcy fraud to 
be a particularly culpable form of fraud.172 
Moreover, such manipulation by courts ignores the "evolutionary" 
nature of the writing process of the Guidelines.173 The Sentencing 
Commission has intermittently amended the Guidelines to correct 
problems in the sentencing procedure as identified by federal courts in 
166. See id. 
167. See United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
"[a]ttempts, in effect, to manipulate the Guidelines in order to achieve the 'right result' in a 
given case are inconsistent with the Guidelines' goal of creating uniformity in sentencing"). 
Although such attempts to reach a just sentence might promote individualized sentencing, 
they would alter the balance between proportionality and uniformity established by the Sen­
tencing Commission. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3). 
168. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3). 
169. See id. 
170. The Sentencing Commission looked to empirical data on pre-Guidelines sentencing 
to decide the relevant distinctions that it would include in the Guidelines. See id. It looked 
"to those distinctions that judges and legislators have, in fact, made over the course of time." 
Id. The categories "include most of the major distinctions that statutes and data suggest 
made a significant difference in sentencing decisions." Id. The categories will only rarely 
fail to reflect relevant distinctions. See id. The Commission, however, did omit relevant dis­
tinctions reflected in established practices where it felt that doing so would effectuate impor­
tant policy goals. See id. 
171. See, e.g., id. (stating that the Sentencing Commission looked to the treatment of 
crimes by Congress as one guide in establishing the framework of the Guidelines). 
172 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (giving a sentence range of 0 to 5 years for bank­
ruptcy fraud), with id. § 286 (sentence range of 0 to 10 years for conspiracy to defraud the 
government with respect to claims), id. § 287 (sentence range of 0 to 5 years for false, ficti­
tious, or fraudulent claims made against the government), and id. § 288 (sentence of 0 to 1 
year for false claims for postal losses). 
173. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(2). 
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their opinions.174 If the Sentencing Commission intends to provide an 
enhancement for the abuse of process inherent in bankruptcy fraud, 
then it will revise the Guidelines to reflect this intent.175 
Until the Sentencing Commission makes such revisions, however, 
courts should apply the Guidelines as written.176 Gaps that courts per­
ceive in the sentencing scheme are "more appropriately a legislative 
concem."177 A contrary position would allow courts to apply the 
Guidelines based on ad hoc justifications or idiosyncratic motivations 
and present the very same risks as broad judicial discretion in terms of 
creating "the wide disparity that Congress established the Commission 
to reduce."178 It would also contravene the Sentencing Commission's 
intent of creating "detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sen­
tences for offenders convicted of federal crimes."179 
IV. PERJURY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FRAUD 
This Part examines the applicability of the Guidelines' base of­
fense provision for perjury to bankruptcy fraud. It argues that bank­
ruptcy fraud is more appropriately punished under the perjury provi­
sion than the fraud provision of the Guidelines. This Part concludes 
that punishing bankruptcy fraud under the perjury provision would fa­
cilitate the Sentencing Commission's goals of uniform and proportion­
ate sentencing. 
Many courts believe that sentencing bankruptcy fraud under the 
fraud provision without the process enhancement is problematic be­
cause the base sentence imposed by section 2Fl.1 does not reflect the 
severity of the defendant's abuse of process.180 As noted by the court 
174. See id. ch. 1, pt. A{5); see also T.R Goldman, Awaiting Sentence: Vacancies, Poli­
tics Bring Sentence Panel to Brink of Paralysis, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 24 & 31, 1998, at 1 
(stating that the Sentencing Commission resolved 5 of22 circuit splits it put out for comment 
in 1997, and 6 of 14 in 1998). 
175. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(5). 
176. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 42 {1993); United States v. Harriott, 
976 F.2d 198, 203 {4th Cir. 1992). 
177. Harriott, 976 F.2d at 203. 
178. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A{3) (stating that the Commission views the Guide­
lines' writing process as "evolutionary" and that the Commission will submit amendments to 
Congress as it deems necessary based on its "research, experience, and analysis"). 
179. Id. ch. l, pt. A{l). 
180. See, e.g., United States v. Guthrie, 144 F.3d 1006, 1009 {6th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
the enhancement is necessary to distinguish defendants convicted of bankruptcy fraud from 
defendants who commit other fraud crimes); United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 
{10th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 {8th Cir. 1991) {same); see 
also United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 331 {7th Cir. 1995) (noting that section 2Fl.1 
"covers a variety of crimes involving fraud" and "must be adjusted through the use of the 
specific offense characteristics"). See generally supra Part III (discussing policy justifications 
advanced by courts for applying the process enhancement to abuses of the bankruptcy proc· 
ess). 
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in Lloyd, bankruptcy defendants violate the sanctity of bankruptcy 
proceedings by illegitimately seeking shelter from creditors and hin­
dering the orderly administration of the bankruptcy estate.181 The rea­
soning of such courts highlights a potential shortcoming of sentencing 
bankruptcy fraud offenses under the fraud provision.182 Although the 
fraud provision accounts for a defendant's aggravated criminal intent, 
demonstrated by violating a court or administrative decree or order, it 
does not provide an enhancement that would punish bankruptcy fraud 
defendants for their abuse of process.183 This undermines the Guide­
lines' goal of proportional sentencing. 
A plausible response to such concerns would be to sentence defen­
dants convicted of bankruptcy fraud under section 2J1.3, the Guide­
lines' base offense provision for perjury, instead of under section 
2F1.1, the fraud base offense provision.184 Sentencing bankruptcy 
fraud defendants under section 2J1.3 ("the perjury provision") would 
facilitate two separate goals of the Guidelines.185 Requiring courts to 
sentence bankruptcy fraud under the perjury provision would promote 
uniformity, eliminating the division between the circuits as to the ap­
propriateness of the process enhancement. Sentencing bankruptcy de­
fendants under the perjury provision would also promote proportion­
ality by accounting for a defendant's abuse of process, a characteristic 
that differentiates bankruptcy fraud from fraud in general. 
The Guidelines indicate that courts should sentence defendants 
under the base offense "most applicable to the offense of convic­
tion"186 and "most appropriate for the nature of the offense conduct 
charged."187 Bankruptcy fraud consists of any number of knowing or 
fraudulent representations or omissions made in the course of a bank­
ruptcy proceeding.188 In essence, bankruptcy fraud punishes the de­
fendant for "fraud upon the court."189 Perjury similarly punishes a de­
fendant's "deliberately making material false or misleading statements 
181. See Lloyd, 947 F.2d at 340. 
182 See United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1997). 
183. See USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.l. 
184. See id. § 2Jl.3 ("Perjury or Subornation of Perjury; Bribery of Witness"); United 
States v. Kaster, No. 97-3210, 1998 WL 78995, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1998) (approving of 
use of section 2Jl.3 because it found that, in this particular instance, the defendant did not 
harm his creditors); Michalek, 54 F.3d at 331 n.11 ("The Sentencing Guidelines recognize 
that the statute's prohibitions against bribery and perjury are best addressed outside the 
scope of § 2Fl.l." (citing USSG, supra note 3, app. A)). The base offense level for perjury is 
12. See USSG, supra note 3, § 2Jl.3. 
185. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
186. USSG, supra note 3, § 1Bl.2(a). 
187. Id. app. A, introduction. 
188. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West Supp. 1999); 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). 
189. United States v. Beard, 913 F.2d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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while under oath."190 Most courts state that the abuse of process 
caused by the defendant's perjury, and not by the fraud, constitutes 
the "gravamen" of bankruptcy fraud.191 In fact, the bankruptcy disclo­
sure forms indicate on their face that incomplete disclosure constitutes 
perjury.192 Thus, the perjury provision, not section 2F1.1, would seem 
to be the base offense provision most applicable to bankruptcy 
fraud.193 
The few cases that have examined the applicability of the perjury 
provision to the crime of bankruptcy fraud, however, have chosen not 
to apply it to bankruptcy fraud.194 The courts in these cases have 
based their conclusion primarily on their characterization of bank­
ruptcy fraud as a "fraud."195 The court in United States v. Kaster for 
example, although upholding the sentencing of a defendant convicted 
of bankruptcy fraud under the perjury provision of the Guidelines, in­
dicated in dicta that it would not reach the same conclusion in most 
bankruptcy cases where defendants "do not disclose their assets" be­
cause they "want to maintain their interest in those assets at the ex­
pense of their creditors."196 
190. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1160; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1621 
(1994) (making a willful declaration under penalty of perjury as to any material matter that 
one "does not believe to be true"); United States v. Dunnigan, SITT U.S. 87, 94 (1993) (de­
fining perjury as "false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to pro­
vide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory"). 
191. United States v. Kaster, No. 97-3210, 1998 WL 78995, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 1998); 
United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Lloyd, 947 
F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Messner, lfJ7 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (stating that a bankruptcy fraud defendant "works a fraud on the entirety of the 
proceeding"). 
192 See e.g., Official Bankr. Form 1, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999); Official Bankr. 
Form 6, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1999). 
193. See Kaster, 1998 WL 78995, at *3. 
194. See, e.g., id. at *3 n.4 (upholding application of section 2Jl.3 to the particular case 
but indicating that, in general, courts should use section 2Fl.1 to sentence bankruptcy 
fraud); Beard, 913 F.2d at 197-98 (holding section 2Fl.1 to be the most appropriate provision 
for sentencing bankruptcy fraud because it constitutes a "fraud upon the court," and the 
Statutory Index did not include section 2Jl.3 as an appropriate basis to sentence bankruptcy 
fraud); see also United States v. Turner, 182 F.3d 934 (unpublished disposition), 1999 WL 
357500, at *2 (10th Cir. June 6, 1999) (upholding the district court's application of section 
2Fl.1 and not 2Jl.3 because the "[d]efendant's false statement under bankruptcy petition 
was made for purposes relating to fraudulent activity"). 
195. See, e.g., Turner, 1999 WL 357500, at *2 (characterizing the defendant's actions as 
relating to a "fraudulent activity"); Kaster, 1998 WL 78995, at *3 n.4 (stating that in general 
bankruptcy petitioners fraudulently fail to disclose assets); Beard, 913 F.2d at 197-98 (hold­
ing bankruptcy to be a "fraud upon the court"). The court in Beard also based its holding on 
the Guidelines Statutory Index, which listed section 2Fl.1 as the appropriate provision for 
sentencing bankruptcy fraud. See id. at 197-98. 
196. 1998 WL 78995, at *3 (stating that in the specific case before it, the defendant's 
crime resembled perjury more than fraud because the defendant perjured himself "for the 
purpose of hiding an alter-ego created because of a prior felony conviction" and "not pecu­
niary gain - a characteristic normally associated with fraud"). 
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Several factors favor the application of the perjury provision to 
bankruptcy fraud despite this precedent. First, an examination of the 
reasoning of these courts reveals a subtle, yet material, misapprehen­
sion of the nature of bankruptcy fraud.197 Congress's definition of 
bankruptcy fraud, as well as that of most courts, centers on the defen­
dant's deception of the bankruptcy court.198 The courts that have con­
cluded that bankruptcy fraud should be sentenced under the Guide­
lines' fraud provision, however, have relied on the defendant's 
deception of creditors.199 Because Congress and most courts view 
bankruptcy fraud primarily as a fraud on the court rather than a fraud 
on creditors, the perjury provision is the most appropriate provision 
for sentencing bankruptcy fraud defendants. 
Moreover, the commentary to section 2Fl.1 indicates that where a 
fraud-based crime is subject to divergent characterizations, the court 
should apply a provision other than section 2Fl.1 if it "more aptly 
cover[s]" the offense of conviction.200 Courts, for example, punish 
false statements to customs officials under section 2T3.1, the Guide­
lines' provision for false statements to customs officials, and not under 
section 2Fl.1, despite the fact that such conduct could easily be char­
acterized as a fraud.201 The Sentencing Commission's 1990 amend­
ment of the Statutory Index to include section 2J1.3 for sentencing 
bankruptcy fraud indicates the Commission's approval of the perjury 
provision as an appropriate alternative to section 2Fl.l.202 
By applying the perjury provision, courts would no longer have to 
manipulate the process enhancement in order to impose proportional 
sentences. Since perjury inherently involves abuse of process, sen­
tencing defendants under the perjury provision would obviate the type 
197. Compare, e.g., id. (focusing on the nonpecuniary motive of the defendant in de­
frauding his creditors), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West Supp. 1999) (focusing on the fraudulent 
concealment from the court). 
198. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West Supp. 1999) (focusing on defendant's deception of the 
bankruptcy court); see also United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325, 332 (7th Cir. 1994) (stat­
ing that abuse of process of the bankruptcy court constitutes the gravamen of bankruptcy 
fraud (citing United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991))). 
199. See Kaster, 1998 WL 78995, at *3 (finding it "reasonable to assume that the major­
ity of bankruptcy petitioners who do not disclose their assets simply want to maintain their 
interest in those assets at the expense of their creditors"); see also Beard, 913 F.2d at 197 
(characterizing bankruptcy fraud as a "fraud upon the court"). 
200. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.l application note 14. 
201. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo-Hernandez, 963 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that a defendant convicted of "knowingly transporting money in excess of 
$10,000 without making a report" should be sentenced pursuant to section 21'3.1, which 
punishes false statements to customs officials, not under section 2Fl.1). Courts also do this 
with other fraud-like crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 999 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 
1993) (sentencing a defendant convicted of mail fraud under the Antitrust Guideline, section 
2Rl.1, as opposed to section 2Fl.l, because price-fixing, not fraud, was the goal of the crimi­
nal enterprise). 
202. See USSG, supra note 3, app. A, 1990 amendments. 
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of policy concerns driving courts to enhance the sentences of bank­
ruptcy fraud defendants under the process enhancement.203 At the 
same time, bankruptcy fraud defendants would receive longer sen­
tences under the perjury provision than under section 2F1.1, reflecting 
the importance of protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy process.204 
Moreover, such an approach would reserve the process enhancement 
for the type of crimes that the Sentencing Commission intended the 
process to apply to, namely those involving defendants who demon­
strate aggravated criminal intent in perpetrating a fraud by violating a 
court or administrative order or decree. 
Thus, sentencing courts should apply the perjury provision because 
perjury constitutes the "gravamen" of bankruptcy fraud. Applying the 
perjury provision would allow courts to impose on bankruptcy fraud 
defendants the sentences that account for the harm they wreak on the 
bankruptcy system while providing for a uniform system of sentencing 
bankruptcy fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy fraud constitutes an emerging epidemic in the federal 
criminal justice system. While bankruptcy fraud wastes judicial re­
sources and undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system,205 such 
negative consequences do not give courts free rein to interpret the 
Guidelines' provisions, such as the process enhancement, as they see 
fit. Although Congress and the Sentencing Commission intended to 
create a flexible sentencing system, responsive to the multitude of sce­
narios that courts might face, courts do not have unlimited discretion. 
203. See, e.g., Kaster, 1998 WL 78995, at *2 (finding that defendant's "actions most 
harmed the integrity of the court and, therefore, more resembleD perjury than fraud"). 
Some bankruptcy fraud defendants would also qualify for a section 2Jl.3(b )(2) enhancement 
for substantial interference with the administration of justice, depending on the stage of the 
bankruptcy proceeding at which the government discovers their fraud. See id. at *1 (sen­
tence of bankruptcy fraud defendant enhanced under § 2Jl.3(b)(2)). This enhancement 
punishes conduct that, among other circumstances, results in "any judicial determination 
based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence." USSG, supra note 3, § 2Jl.3 
application note 1. 
204. The Guidelines also direct that where more than one Guidelines' provision is appli­
cable to a given crime, the provision that results in the "greater offense level" should be 
used. See USSG, supra note 3, § lBl.1 application note 5. The perjury provision is arguably 
the more appropriate provision because it will more often result in the greater offense level. 
The base offense level for fraud is 6. See id. § 2Fl.1. Under the perjury provision, the de­
fendant's base offense would be 12, and with the substantial interference with the admini­
stration of justice enhancement would reach 15. See id. § 2Jl.3. If loss, however, is factored 
in under the fraud provision, any loss over $200,000 will result in an enhancement of 8 (for a 
total level of 16) and make the fraud provision the harsher of the two provisions. See id. § 
2Fl.1. 
205. See, e.g., United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
"[b]ankruptcy fraud undermines the whole concept of allowing a debtor to obtain protection 
from creditors, pay debts in accord with the debtor's ability and thereby obtain a fresh 
start"); Gaumer, supra note 2, at 12 (noting the special nature of bankruptcy proceedings). 
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Applying the process enhancement in a manner that contravenes 
the literal language of the provision and the Sentencing Commission's 
intent, as expressed through the Guidelines' policy statements and 
commentary, exceeds the discretion conferred on sentencing courts by 
the Guidelines. Moreover, basing the process enhancement on idio­
syncratic reasoning creates the potential for nonuniform treatment of 
similarly situated defendants. As such, it contravenes one of the cen­
tral goals of the Guidelines, to create "reasonable uniformity in sen­
tencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for 
similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. "206 In fact, 
by applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud, courts 
ironically perpetuate the very disproportionate sentencing that they 
are attempting to eliminate. Thus, despite their reservations and until 
such a time as the Sentencing Commission chooses to address the issue 
through revision or amendment of section 2Fl.l, courts must remain 
true to the Guidelines as they exist. Although reading the process en­
hancement to exclude fraudulent nondisclosure in bankruptcy fraud 
contradicts the interpretation of the majority of federal circuits, it nev­
ertheless seems to be the fairest reading of the process enhancement 
provision. 
Sentencing courts have other options. Courts can utilize the 
Guidelines' perjury provision to sentence defendants convicted of 
bankruptcy fraud. The perjury provision may be preferable to section 
2Fl.1 in the eyes of many courts because it accounts for a defendant's 
abuse of process. By sentencing bankruptcy fraud under the perjury 
provision, courts can create a consistent paradigm for sentencing 
bankruptcy fraud defendants. Such a system would facilitate propor­
tional sentencing by subjecting defendants convicted_ of bankruptcy 
fraud to the higher sentences of the perjury provision, while obviating 
the need for sentencing courts to engage in creative interpretations of 
the Guidelines that undermine the Sentencing Commission's goal of 
uniform sentencing. 
206. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). 
